We use VoltBuilder to build Android (APK) and iOS (IPA) apps, and our customers are asking about the recently disclosed Node.js vulnerability CVE-2026-111497 (also known as node2shell), which is triggered by crafted Brotli-compressed data.
Could you please help us with the following questions?
1. Does the VoltBuilder build environment use Node.js? If so, has it been updated to a version that fixes CVE-2026-111497 (22.23.4, 24.22.1, 26.12.1 or later), or is it otherwise not affected?
2. During a build, the environment downloads remote content such as Cordova plugins and npm packages. Could a malicious or compromised external source use a crafted Brotli response to exploit this vulnerability on the build server?
3. Is there an official security statement about this CVE that we can share with our customers?
Thank for you reaching out. We’ll be posting an official statement on this later today, but I can provide some of the details here for you right now.
We use Node.js for several portions of our infrastructure. Any instances exposed to the public internet were updated within 24 hours of the CVE being released. While we have no evidence that servers were exploited in any way, private keys were rotated as a security precaution. Build servers also use Node.js as part of the Cordova/Capacitor build process. These are generally not affected, but we are working to upgrade our build images and will have more on that soon. Because of the nature of this exploit and the fact that builds run in isolated containers/VMs that are reset after each build and aren’t publicly accessible, our security team deemed the risk acceptable.
While this is possible, it’s unlikely. What is much more likely is that a compromised NPM package could exfiltrate source/secrets from a build. We limit outgoing network traffic to attempt to mitigate this exact issue. It’s very important to be carefully vetting NPM packages (there have been multiple examples of packages being subverted). However, most vulnerabilities around NPM packages are more about establishing long term control of a computer and/or looking for common security credentials (NPM tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, etc…). Again because our environments are isolated, there is no chance that a malicious package could persist between builds.
We will be releasing a statement later today documenting how we’ve mitigated this risk.
Please let me know if you have any further questions.
Thank you for the quick and detailed answer. This is very helpful and gives us what we need to inform our customers.
We will reference your official statement once it is published.
One small follow-up: you mentioned that private keys were rotated as a precaution. Can you confirm that these are keys from your own infrastructure, and that customers who submit builds to VoltBuilder do not need to rotate or regenerate any credentials on their side (for example, API keys or account credentials)?
You have it correct - those were infrastructure keys. We do not store customer keys and there is no reason for any customer to regernate any keys or credentials.
You mentioned that VoltBuilder would publish an official statement about CVE-2026-111497 and how the risk was mitigated. Has this statement been published yet? If so, could you share the link? We would like to reference it in our customer documentation.
Also, could you let us know if the upgrade of the build images to a patched Node.js version is now complete?
Our Android build servers are currently running Node 26.13.0. We expect to have an updated iOS image in beta by the end of the week that will also be using Node 26.13.0. Because of the nature of this vulnerability, the risk is negligible in non-internet facing environments. Our statement explains this in more depth.